For decades, Myanmar’s political problems have been defined in terms of armed conflicts, ethnic conflicts, ethnic politics, and identity politics. Accordingly, political struggles have been framed as movements for democracy, peace and federalism against authoritarian regimes. None of these ways of looking at political challenges in Myanmar are unfounded or wrong, but one key problem at the heart of the country’s political crisis is missing from political discourse: racism.

The reason for this absence is partly because of a lack of proper definition of racism in Burmese that corresponds to the Myanmar context. The Burmese word for racism that most people are familiar with, at least until very recently, is အသားအရောင်ခွဲခြားခြင်း (A Thar A Yaung Kwe Char Chin, literally, “skin colour discrimination”). It is a direct translation of western experiences of racism and how it is framed culturally and linguistically based on skin colour, but experiences of discrimination and oppression in Myanmar are primarily based on ethnoreligious difference, with skin colour representing just one element of this. Despite this, terms such as လူမျိုးဘာသာခွဲခြားခြင်း (Lu Myo Bar Thar Kwe Char Chin) which reflect discrimination based on ethnicity and religion have been coined more recently but are not as commonly used.

Racism and race relations are not merely about ethnoreligious discrimination but also reflect the foundational organization of political structures. Racial thinking or Lu Myo Yae thinking shapes, and is shaped by, conceptions of sovereignty, territorial rights, the hierarchy of privilege, access to resources, legitimate rights for political decision making, wealth accumulation, gender and class relations, and so on. Racial thinking, like other types of thinking that influence political structures, determines who the state is obligated to serve and protect and who it is not (therefore making other groups vulnerable).

A good example of this is a narrative in Myanmar that the majority Burmese Buddhists are the “homeowners” (i.e. the owners of the country), and the rest are “guests.” While the popularity of this specific narrative is recent, the idea has existed for a long time. It explicitly means that the homeowner and the guest do not have the same political and socio-economic rights. Within the identity of “guest” is the implicit duty to respect the host (and their rights and privileges) by behaving properly — as good guests should, while the homeowners embody an implicit paternalistic duty to look after the guests (Note: This narrative became popular in the context of the Rakhine State violence, with references to the Rohingya as guests. Since then, this narrative has been used in different contexts and locations in Myanmar.)

Despite this, contemporary social and political movements in Myanmar rarely utilize anti-racism as a lens to look at politics and political crises. For urban political movements that still revolve around the politics and narrative of the 1988 uprisings (and the NLD), democracy is the main goal; issues of discrimination and equality are marginal. Rhetorical mottos that urge compassion and empathy only serve as abstract ideals and often produce condescending narratives towards minorities and victims of oppression.

For the interfaith and social harmony movements that are mostly taking place in Yangon, Mandalay and provincial towns, tolerating religious and ethnic differences is a goal. They have not aimed to challenge or eliminate the racism that underpins intolerance in the wider political and economic systems.

For ethnic armed organizations, with goals of equality and federalism, anti-racism is not a framework, narrative, or strategy that guides the pursuit of these goals. Close observation of the peace process over the past seven years demonstrates that negotiations based around the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and political dialogue have not touched upon fundamental issues related to race relations. Several articles within the NCA (Chapters 1 & 6) and the Union Accord (Part 1, Annex 1) focus on diversity and equality. Although written in highly convoluted language, these articles mention equal political rights as well as the rights to preserve and protect minority customs, traditions, languages and literature. However, the actual political negotiations between the government and ethnic armed groups have failed to discuss the very racial thinking in the political system that has led to the oppression of minority groups. They have also failed to discuss how such racial thinking is reproduced in schools, religious teachings, and state-sponsored films and literature, all of which have collectively normalized racist perceptions of minority populations as “guests” who, by default, are not supposed to be equal with the majority. As a result, these discussions and statements that champion equality, non-discrimination, and diversity come across as artificial and the language of equality in the agreements is little better than the Burmese-centric state propaganda about ethnic unity, which people are already familiar with due to decades of indoctrination through the school system, books, television, and movies. (It is worth noting here that racial thinking in religious and ethnic minority groups is also problematic that needs to be addressed.)

For the handful of urban “educated” elites, nationalism and discrimination are serious issues. Still, their priorities are to cap nationalism, complete nation-building, and foster national identities encompassing the country’s diverse cultures, however contradictory these ambitions sound.

Because of failures by the political movements to challenge racism on the one hand and the relative success of state propaganda on the other, the racial thinking that is deeply embedded in the fabric of the political system is left unexposed. Possibilities for vibrant intellectual and political investigations into this matter have not advanced and people thus continue to look at political and social issues through a racist lens (albeit often inadvertently), even when they are talking about reconciliation and unity.

A recent example is that of a state-level government minister in Shan State who wrote on Facebook that charging 300 MMK (0.20 USD) extra for noodles to non-Shan customers was extremist discrimination and shameful. Some ethnic Shan responded that he might have misunderstood the matter and that the price difference was not due to the ethnicity of the customer but due the difference between types of noodles such as “Shan noodles” or “Tofu Nwe” (Tofu with noodles). To many, the NLD minister’s accusation was an insult to the whole Shan ethnicity. He later deleted the post and apologized. But the apology letter caused another problem as it condescendingly lectured people to put aside differences, focus on COVID-19 prevention, and forgive/yield to others (even when he was the one whose initial statement sparked the row).