There are a number of reasons why the survey estimates might differ from our expectations. The first is response bias— the tendency to give untruthful answers. The high ratings might result from the respondents’ tendency to give affirmative responses. For example, when they are asked the extent to which they agree or disagree with a statement, they would respond “agree” even if they do not necessarily agree with the statement. This tendency may result from an unwillingness to reveal negative opinions about the state due to fear of retribution by the government; this may be fueled by Myanmar’s authoritarian past and incomplete regime transition.

Another reason for the respondents’ tendency to give affirmative responses could be rooted in a-na deh culture in Myanmar, rather than in its authoritarian past. Respondents might shy away from asserting their opinion, especially if it is contrary to the affirmative statements the enumerators read to them. If there is a severe response bias in the data, Kachin’s real national pride and attachment to Myanmar is likely to be lower and weaker than what the survey data suggests.

The second is biases in our priors. Those in the mainstream Kachin society as well as researchers like myself tend to assume that Kachin generally have unfavorable views regarding the Myanmar state. However, it is possible that this view emerges from an echo chamber, rather than a reflection of reality. Some of the loudest voices in the Kachin community might highlight the political alienation of Kachin and generally negative views of the state on various social media platforms. Other Kachin might in turn, become more prone to express unfavorable views of the Myanmar state and the government when they are in groups discussing current affairs, affirming each other’s negative views. However, when they are alone (like when they are interviewed alone), they might express their own views, which are more positive than the ones amplified in group settings. If there is a severe bias in our priors, Kachin’s real national pride and attachment to Myanmar are likely to be higher and stronger than our expectations.

The third is the diversity of socio-political views within the Kachin community, which consists of six ethno-linguistic groups: Jinghpaw, Lachid, Lhaovo, Lisu, Rawang, and Zaiwa. Though Jinghpaw is generally thought to be the dominant group, most of the Kachin ethno-linguistic groups are politically active— meaning the group has mobilized either an armed organization and/or a political party that claims to represent its interests. Thus, members of different ethno-linguistic groups may hold varying views of Myanmar. Kachin respondents’ attachment to Myanmar as indicated by the survey may be high because some segments of the Kachin community have much more favorable attitudes toward the Myanmar state compared to others.

To better understand the diversity of attitudes toward the Myanmar state in the Kachin community, the respondents in the sample are distinguished into two groups: (1) those who identify as Kachin and speak Jinghpaw and (2) those who identify as Kachin but do not speak Jinghpaw. The first group accounts for 81 percent of the sample and the second group, 19 percent. The first group is likely to consist of Kachin from an array of ethno-linguistic groups, because many Kachin speak two or more Kachin languages— typically, Jinghpaw and another Kachin language, and the second of Kachin belonging to non-Jinghpaw Kachin ethno-linguistic groups.