First, we want to urge a different understanding of what Ma Ba Tha represents through its name. The group’s preferred English translation of its (former) name is “The Patriotic Association of Myanmar;” scholars and media tend to translate its full name (A-myo, batha thathana saun shauq ye a-hpwe, အမျိုး ဘာသာ သာသနာ စောင့်ရှောက်ရေး အဖွဲ့ ) more literally as “The Organization for the Protection of Race and Religion.” Much scholarly and media analysis paints this as aligned with inherently exclusionary identity markes, on both “national” (a problematic translation, for reasons we explain below) and religious grounds. It may be so, but we argue that the term’s unique combination of inclusivity and ambiguity, alongside exclusion, both helps to fuel Ma Ba Tha’s popularity and contains the seeds of its own division.

The key terms in Ma Ba Tha’s name, the things it was formed to protect, are a-myo (အမျိုး), batha (ဘာသာ), and thathana (သာသနာ). This is a revitalization (and slight reinterpretation) of a common mantra popularized by the nationalist Dobama Asiayone (“We, the Burmese Association”) in the 1930s during the struggle against British colonial rule, but with important implications for today’s ethno-religious landscape.

A-myo has been variously translated as “race” or “nation;” in some cases it seems to refer to bloodlines as well. A variant, lu myo (လူမျိုး), can also signify ethnicity, although the root word simply means “type” or “type of person.” In some situations, the response to an inquiry about one’s lu myo could also be one’s religious identity. While Ma Ba Tha’s rhetoric and membership paint it as a multi-ethnic organization, most analysis of the group positions it—usually implicitly—as an ethnic Burman organization.

In the 1930s, batha would have referred to batha-saga (ဘာသာစကား, language), although in the contemporary context it is taken to mean batha-ye (ဘာသာရေး, religion), which Ma Ba Tha says in its founding documents applies to any of the religions professed by the 135 recognized taingyintha (a term often translated as “national races,” but with an additional implication of indigeneity). This means that in theory it includes Christianity, Hinduism, Animism and even Islam, although in practice many Ma Ba Tha figures have deployed this argument rather disingenuously and prioritized Buddhism in their rhetoric and activities.

Thathana (သာသနာ, Pali sāsana) is often used as shorthand to refer to the Buddhist religion, but its scope is much more comprehensive. It includes the Buddha’s teachings, the texts and commentaries, material elements of the religion such as temples and monasteries, the sangha and lay communities, and the lived experience of the teachings among Buddhists themselves. The anthropologist Bénédicte Brac de la Perrière describes thathana as “religion as teaching instituted in a ‘social space.’” Without thathana, Buddhism would cease to exist in any meaningful way. And, given the Buddha’s claim that all things, even knowledge of his teachings, are impermanent, even something like the Buddhist calendar seems to convey the fleeting nature of thathana in a very acute and visceral sense, experienced as the counting down of days for the very existence of Buddhism.

Although we have disaggregated the terms here, for many, if not most, of those working for the protection of a-myo, batha, thathana, the identities are inseparable. This sentiment is reflected in the commonly cited aphorism “To be Burmese is to be Buddhist.” While the first label in this sentence, “Burmese,” is usually taken to refer only to the ethnic Burman majority (technically, the words are the same in the Burmese language), a similar sentiment probably exists for other Buddhist-majority ethnic groups in Myanmar. For example, one Rakhine human rights activist told us, “I strongly believe that a true Rakhine wouldn’t believe in any religion other than Buddhism. I am Buddhist myself and we’ve believed in Buddhism since the time of our grandparents and their grandparents.”

This collective identity, then, refers to a community that is defined by religion—primarily Buddhism—but otherwise more nebulously and perhaps contingently bounded. However, much of what is at stake here is that the a-myo, batha, thathana nexus is defined in various, divergent, even conflicting ways. Many supporters are motivated chiefly by religious concerns, although there is disagreement over how best to protect the religion.

Here we want to offer a crucial conceptual distinction that helps to explain the abiding support for Ma Ba Tha, even among people who reject its anti-Muslim arguments: we distinguish between Ma Ba Tha (the organisation for the protection of a-myo, batha, thathana) and a more general sentiment that it is a noble duty of both monks and lay Buddhists to protect and propagate a-myo, batha, thathana. We label this second phenomenon ma ba tha, in reference to a widespread—not necessarily divisive or exclusionary—impulse among Buddhists that is unlikely to disappear. It can motivate both violent externally-oriented defences of the religion as well as more internally-oriented campaigns to strengthen belief and practice, especially in times of rapid change and uncertainty.

Ma Ba Tha (the organization) vaulted to prominence in 2014 and 2015 by filling a religio-cultural vacuum and effectively claiming an interpretive and practical monopoly on the protection of ma ba tha. For a time, this made it the only nationwide channel for supporting ma ba tha work, seen as essential to many Buddhists. Ma Ba Tha’s journals, as well as pronouncements by its leaders and sermons given by its monks, convey a particular understanding of ma ba tha, one that, while superficially inclusive in some ways, conveys the prominence of Buddhism in Myanmar national identity.  

All of this matters because ma ba tha has become the ground upon which religio-political claims are articulated to the public, to formal religious authorities and to the state, and since 2013, Ma Ba Tha has largely controlled this discourse. Yet ma ba tha remains a nebulous term, with a lack of agreement over how best to protect the religion—understood in terms of the most effective methods as well as those that are more consonant with Buddhist teachings—and proper moral conduct of both monks and laity. Not only have political parties, ethnic armed groups and other organizations taken up the protection of ma ba tha in their platforms, the government has a particular interest in asserting unifying—and often homogenizing—narratives of identity. For that, ma ba tha is potentially powerful, but also potentially divisive, given the tendency of a-myo to be interpreted along subnational (ethnic) lines. We examine those divisions below, but first we look at how Ma Ba Tha has promoted itself as a champion of both Buddhism and community development.