Keeping your communications with and material concerning people in Myanmar secure should be a guiding principle. Ensure that only you can read your communication by using encrypted messengers such as Signal, Wire, and, in case of emergency without internet access, Silence SMS or pre-established codewords, as the RMMG suggests. Silence SMS works with the same encryption techniques as Signal but uses them to encrypt text messages sent over the regular mobile network rather than the internet. Signal further allows for disappearing messages which can be enabled in a conversation’s settings for sensitive communication.

As long as there is some internet connectivity, even in a wide-ranging but non-total shutdown, there is a very slim chance of messages getting transmitted through remaining connections utilizing mesh-messengers such as Bridgefy or Briar. None of these apps are ideal. Bridgefy seems to have patched their known vulnerabilities (which made de-anonymization of users possible; compare Albrecht et al. 2020) and claims to be using e2ee as of app versions after October 2020. Unlike Bridgefy, Briar is open source and uses further encryption measures but does not establish a synchronous network. Instead, messages are forwarded from device to device, making it potentially slower. While these apps can be vital to keep communication up, only consider installing those and getting your contacts’ details for them if strictly needed if you are not in Myanmar, as setting them up takes up valuable time and bandwidth from your contacts at a time when both are rare. Bear in mind that limited connectivity means larger files such as audio, image, or video files are not easily transmittable.

To guard against illegitimate access, to which those outside Myanmar can also fall prey, ensure that no one can access your accounts clandestinely. Many services, including Facebook, allow for logouts on all previously connected devices. This can be a first step; otherwise, if adverse agents get a hold of a device, either physically or remotely, they could gain access to accounts and contacts. Activate 2FA in the same settings. Consider regular password changes so that a stolen or insecurely stored password does not pose as significant a risk. The easiest way to do this is through using a password manager which securely stores your passwords, such as KeePassXC (computers, with browser plug-ins for Firefox and Chrome), KeePassDX (Android), and KeePassium (iPhone), as the document recommends. Those programs create encrypted databases that you can then keep synchronized copies of on your cloud storage. You will only need to remember one hard-to-guess password to unlock your database. The apps can then fill in your details whenever required, even checking whether it is a legitimate website asking for them if you set them up that way.

Keep all your software up-to-date to avoid security loopholes that third parties could exploit. It is often easier to do so through the respective app stores, which take care of regular updates on standard devices. Therefore, if security loopholes have been identified, they can be patched. If you do not use the stores, you need to make sure to update your apps manually.

Ask your contacts, if appropriate, if it would be helpful for them to check in with you as their ‘buddy’ regularly. While people outside Myanmar are ideal ‘buddies’ because they are in a different location and hence, for instance, less likely to be arrested, their usefulness is reduced in case of a shutdown. Remember that emails are not, by default, encrypted. They can easily be intercepted and read by third parties. The easiest way to communicate through encrypted emails is by both parties using ProtonMail, a free-of-charge service of a Swiss company that also offers free-of-charge VPN services. While VPN is crucial for people in Myanmar now, they are less critical for anyone outside Myanmar unless they fear targeted surveillance, want to cloak their Internet traffic, or circumvent restrictions themselves.