The FPNCC appears to have organised itself very well, down to a neat website and a bilingual charter with a rambling title: ‘The General Principles and Specific Propositions of Revolutionary Armed Organisations of All Nationalities Upon the Political Negotiation.’ This document posits a radical political vision for a federal Myanmar, including a host of specific demands for structural reformation that, for now, appear irreconcilable with the union-centric political visions of the civilian government and the Tatmadaw.

The FPNCC charter uses the term ‘Revolutionary Armed Organisation (RAO)’ in place of EAO. While this might be a minor terminological change, it is a clear attempt to separate themselves from other negotiating parties and wrest the discursive monopoly over the entire peace process from the union government and Tatmadaw. If the idea is to create a foolproof alternative to Naypyidaw’s peace design, then altering the specifics is indeed an effective starting point.

The charter posits total devolution of centralised authority to ethnic ‘nations’, down to the domains of foreign policy, border security, choice of currency, industrial policies, and cultural education. While the current federal structure does allow for a significant degree of politico-economic autonomy to states, the FPNCC’s proposal talks of the kind of decentralisation that Myanmar has never seen before. These aptly encapsulate the longstanding political imagination of peripheral ethnic groups – also captured in the ‘Panglong Spirit’ – who have traditionally distinguished themselves from Myanmar’s Burman majority.

Another remarkable proposition enshrined in the FPNCC charter is the nationalisation and depoliticisation of the Tatmadaw. Although the group recognises the institution as an “important force to ensure the national security of the Union of Myanmar”, it wants the army to stay away from the political affairs of the Union or its constituent nations and only serve as a professional national defence force. It also seeks to remove the army’s 25% fixed seat quota in the Parliament. But, for an institution whose roots run deep into the state apparatus, courtesy of sixty years of totalitarian rule, these propositions could appear ludicrous and even infuriating. There is little possibility that the generals would cede all political space to the civilian government at this moment or permit states to manage international borders, particularly in light of the simmering conflict in Northern Rakhine.

Intriguingly, the opening paragraph of Part Two of the charter states that the “Wa is willing to work with the Union government, Tatmadaw, and fraternal ethnic groups to discuss the principles of national reconciliation, peace, and a new Union of Myanmar.” This is the only instance in the entire document where the name of an individual FPNCC member appears, that too in the clear capacity of a representational authority. In itself, it gives the impression that the Wa might be singlehandedly setting the group’s agenda, perhaps in an undemocratic fashion.