Myo Min outlines the hidden consequences of people’s commitment to minorities within minorities, such as the Rohingya.
When the junta ruthlessly crushed peaceful protestors in the aftermath of the 2021 February coup, the protests evolved into armed resistance. In essence, the nation has split into two groups: one is Myanmar’s Tatmadaw (sit-tat), junta or the common enemy, and the other consists of a diverse group of anti-junta forces representing ‘the people’: the National Unity Government (NUG), People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), which will be regarded as anti-junta forces in this piece. The term resistance forces will refer specifically to armed groups such as the EAOs and PDFs. Since the coup, Myanmar’s ethnically diverse and conflicted groups set aside their differences with the distinct aim of forging a military alliance to fight against sit-tat, the common enemy. This has led to the rise of powerful EAOs, each possessing varying degrees of significant military strength, yet all often driven by their own interests, to emerge as key players of the anti-junta forces.
I argue that there is an issue with this consensus among the anti-junta forces: they reject the military regime, but there is no comprehensive political consensus that adheres to democracy, thus contradicting the initial goal of the movement which was to build a more equitable and federal Myanmar. At the moment, the goal has advanced into the acceptance of “anything” as a political objective other than the sit-tat’s rule. The acceptance of any alternative to the sit-tat spurs support for the ethno-nationalist armed groups among the anti-junta forces at the risk of marginalizing Myanmar’s minorities. In this essay, I examine how this consensus has increased support for the Arakan Army (AA) at the expense of Rohingya rights. Could this be considered a good outcome for discriminated minority groups like the Rohingya, who suffer under sit-tat’s nationalist ideology?
One of the key issues deferred by anti-junta forces who have forged a military alliance is a viable solution for their political differences. There is no sign that the diverse groups currently opposing the junta would overcome their political differences and agree on a broad platform that describes what Myanmar might look like even after more than three years since the coup. For example, the Arakan Army (AA) is rooting for a distinct political entity that adheres to a unitary system, diverging from the policies of the NUG. In a recent interview with The Diplomat, AA’s leader declared, “The United League of Arakan (ULA) will lead as the vanguard party under a unitary state system. The military will operate under the party’s control. In the beginning, we will establish a unitary government that prioritizes central control.” Although the country has found a common enemy—the Myanmar military—the arrangement of a common political goal remains distantly ambitious.
The Federal Democracy Charter draft, released over three years ago, concentrates power in the largest consultative body, the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), alongside the People’s Assembly. It underscores the importance of fostering political consensus, yet, to date, there has been no advancement in this regard. It has been more than two years since the NUG suggested the Federal Union Army (FUA) to make collective reforms in the security sector, but there is no sign that it will materialize. Powerful EAOs remain reluctant to formally embrace that document as they have little faith in the Bamar-dominated leadership and assembly. There is also another powerful actor, the AA, that has shown little to no interest in engaging in dialogues for federalism due to their confederate inspirations.
Furthermore, the People’s Representatives Committee for Federalism (PRCF) published its constitution for a federal democracy on February 12, 2024. The committee was formed after the 2021 February coup and comprised of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) and twelve other ethnic political parties. Sai Kyaw Nyunt, a joint secretary of the SNLD, stated that the objective of their constitution is peaceful co-existence which is critical for the highly diverse and multi-ethnic country to come together to form and maintain a union. He also added, “Myanmar is at war now… military solutions alone can’t solve problems in a country. Space for politics is necessary. It is more powerful than military action in terms of fulfilling the wishes of the people.” But the PCRF constitution has received no significant interest from the anti-junta forces because the Spring Revolution has become all about military success.
Instead, the EAOs’ records of launching a large-scale offensive against the junta are hailed as heroes of the broader pro-democracy movement. On October 27th, last year, three EAOs, collectively known as the Brotherhood Alliance, launched a large-scale offensive, named Operation 1027. The alliance comprises the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Arakan Army (AA). The operation presented the first serious challenge in decades to the sit-tat, turning these EAOs into the heroes of a wider democratic movement. It has since inspired other EAOs and PDFs to launch synchronized attacks across the country.
A recent report by Crisis Group noted that ethnic militias’ battlefield victories are “likely to be an impediment to, rather than a stepping stone toward, the federal union that many in the country aspire to.” The report also urged that “these military victories are consolidating control of their expanded homeland areas, with many well on the way to establishing autonomous statelets.” The EAOs have engaged in regular clashes with the Tatmadaw, primarily to regain and secure their own lost territory, rather than to support broader democratic movements. As Kachin Independence Army (KIA)’s colonel Naw Bu stated, “our mission is mainly aimed at the security of our territory.” But these varying and, sometimes, conflicting aspirations don’t seem to be a matter of consideration for the anti-junta forces as long as they remain united in an anti-junta alliance. As Maung Saungka, founder of Athan and the commander of Bamar People’s Liberation Army (BPLA), said “BPLA is more focused on battlefield victories than politics… regarding military cooperation, we opt for the only method that avoids division.”
Given the current state of Myanmar’s resistance movement, there is insufficient space for a comprehensive and viable political arrangement. NUCC, the broadest national unity front of the resistance movement, was established to restore democratic governance through constitutionalism is now on the brink of dissolution, primarily due to a diminished level of engagement from anti-junta forces. Ultimately, the country remains politically fragmented with increasingly autonomously governed regions established by the respective armed groups that drive out the military junta’s troops. MNDAA, a leading force in the Operation 1027 anti-regime offensive, has recently declared that “it will not collaborate militarily or politically with the NUG” following its control over most of the northern Shan State, alongside its ally, TNLA.
Another issue is the struggle to keep unity among disparate anti-junta forces that provides fertile ground and impunity for the abuse of power by the resistance forces. Any critique of the arbitrary violence carried out by the resistance forces on social media is often justified as an unwarranted critique of the resistance movement that disrupts the broader war against the common enemy (the sit-tat). The resistance movement has reached a stage where it expects all people to conform under the pretext of unity against the common enemy by the anti-junta forces—without any regard for the different voices or federal-democratic values.
For instance, when Rohingya organizations accused the AA of alleged mass forced displacement and human rights violations against Rohingya communities in Rakhine, it was viewed as an obstacle to the wider war—where the primary mission is to challenge the sit-tat. Kyaw Ko Ko, a founding member of the General Strike Committee (GSC) and former head of the All Burma Federation of Student Unions (ABFSU), accused Rohingya of “peddling misconceptions among the public and international community to put AA in a negative light, thus interrupting the accelerating resistance movement through baseless accusations on social media”. As I argue, this has given more powerful armed groups the upper hand and silenced the concerns of non-dominant minorities in Myanmar’s fragmented political landscape.
These abuses are not limited to silencing critiques of the resistance movement. Since Operation 1027, resistance forces have gained territorial control across different parts of Myanmar. Alongside the success, reports of abuses against civilians committed by the armed groups in newly conquered territories have emerged. Some notable atrocities include the MNDAA’s own brutal forced conscription policy in northern Shan State which forcibly recruits individuals from outside the Kokang ethnic group it represents and executes those who attempt to escape. The armed group has also restricted ethnic Bamar from going back to Laukkai and demolished buildings in a predominantly-Bamar neighborhood of the region.
In Rakhine, the Rohingya population faces increasingly brutal abuses at the hands of the AA, a powerful ethnic armed group and a close ally of the MNDAA. I explore the AA’s abuses in subsequent sections. AA has also reportedly abused ethnic Chin in Palatwa, Chin state, which borders Rakhine. The Global Khumi Organisation issued a statement on 4th June, calling on the AA to “immediately cease arbitrary arrests and detentions of locals in Palatwa Township, the inhumane torture and killing of the arrestees, the committed child rape, and the illegal sale and distribution of drugs, which the international community strictly prohibits.”
Kyaw Zaw, a spokesperson for the NUG, declined to talk about the reported abuses by ethnic armed groups to Foreign Policy, stating that the MNDAA and Arakan Army have denied these claims. Instead, he added that NUG and ethnic resistance forces are capturing and liberating more territories from the areas under the brutal military. However, there continue to be consistent reports of civilian abuses in Sagaing by both NUG-affiliated groups and independent resistance forces. In a shocking atrocity, a NUG militia killed seven scavengers in Chaung-U Township in 2022, allegedly raping four females beforehand, including two minors.
The anti-junta forces have opted to overlook statements of concerns about the alleged human rights abuses by the militia, viewing such concerns as detrimental to the cohesion of the resistance movement. In the worst-case scenario, critical viewpoints about the powerful armed groups are silenced, and those with alternative views are even labelled as adversaries. As Khin Maung Soe, former senior editor at Radio Free Asia (RFA), stated “In Burma, where the military has been oppressing, should I support Than Shwe (former senior general) instead of Aung San Suu Kyi? Should I back the sit-tat instead of the NUG? Don’t be misled by the obvious. There are only two classes in this Spring Revolution: the revolutionaries and the opportunists. Choose your side. I will stand with the oppressed people. The Spring Revolution is being led by the NUG and the EAOs. Therefore, I am with them.”
The abuses within revolutionary movements resulting from silenced minorities and rights abuses are exacerbated by the additional threat to the future of Rohingya in Rakhine state as equal citizens of Myanmar. They have long faced discriminatory policies stemming from Islamophobia and exclusion from Myanmar’s political community, perpetuated by successive military regimes. The current development of the resistance movement appears to be no different, reinforcing a military culture of reliance on weapons and brute strength rather than seeking solutions through comprehensive political dialogue. These issues are particularly problematic for a region like Rakhine, where ethnic and religious divisions have long impacted intercommunal relations, while the dominant armed group, Arakan Army (AA), draws its aspirations from ethno-nationalism.
Following the 2021 coup, while the Rohingya have shown immense support for the democratic movement, the AA discouraged Myanmar’s Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) and street protests spreading to Rakhine, arguing that the movement would disrupt the armed group’s attempt to secure greater autonomy. Nonetheless, the Rohingya activists were optimistic that the CDM would be a turning point for them, given that some Burmese seem to be changing their views of their Muslim countrymen, whom they considered to be illegal migrants before. Indeed, some young activists and student unions began to express sympathy for the Rohingya while expressing regret at having stayed silent at the time of their suffering.
Shortly thereafter, the NUG issued a policy position on the Rohingya in Rakhine state. However, the statement was exclusively in English on X, though the statements are usually released on their website and Facebook page in both English and Burmese. This statement pledges to put an end to human rights violations against the Rohingya and declares their commitment to ensuring Rohingya receive equal citizenship rights, in line with the ideals of federal democracy.
However, this statement received major backlash from the Rakhine Buddhist community who expressed concerns about being “swallowed up by the Muslim community” as a result of Rohingya recognition as an indigenous ethnic group, directly threatening the future of the ethnic Rakhine community. Despite this, there was still a glimmer of hope, as the persistence of Rohingya rights has been a consideration in the policy framework of the NUG. According to the NUG’s policy, their aims include the establishment of a federal democracy that respects the right to self-determination for ethnic minorities.
However, as peaceful protests and the CDM movement turned into armed resistance, the unity required among the anti-junta forces to be an effective armed resistance against the sit-tat has become the overriding factor. Despite the anti-junta forces’ overall agendas, the foundation for an inclusive federal democracy with equality for all ethnic groups in a genuine power-sharing mechanism has made little headway. As Myanmar political analyst Kim Jolliffe said to Al Jazeera, “being unified is not only necessary for military success, but also necessary for the foundation of a post-military Myanmar”. He also added that “the central problem of the revolution is the need to create a system that adequately represents the diversity of Myanmar’s interests and creates a power balance that prevents a single group from being overarching chauvinist controllers.”
Yet, the resistance movement has fallen short of addressing this issue. As the cooperation among anti-junta forces and military success has overshadowed other important aspects of this political shift, the overall action has neglected to address the collective vision of a peaceful, multi-nation state that ensures the rights of each community and individual. Indeed, while the anti-junta forces have managed to reach an unprecedented level of cooperation against the military in their repudiation of the junta regime, it has come at a tremendous cost for members of the coalition whose own rights and ideological differences have been overlooked.
On November 13, about 3 weeks after Operation 1027, AA opened a new front in Rakhine and Chin states—breaking the informal ceasefire agreed with the sit-tat in 2020. With its successful offensives, AA has reached the near-top position by inspiring emerging armed groups with its passionate fighting spirit and successful model for mobilization against the junta. However, as the armed group gained increasing support from anti-junta forces, it also began to expose the supremacist nature of the increasingly powerful Rakhine nationalist movement.
AA’s political ambitions are for a future Rakhine enclave, pursuing the guided strategy called the ‘Way of Rakhita’. It is a liberation movement dedicated to reclaiming the sovereignty that was forfeited following the Burman kingdom’s conquest of the Arakanese capital of Mrauk-U in the late 18th century. In a speech delivered in April 2020, AA’s leader Twan Mrat Naing described the Way of Rakhita as “the struggle for national liberation and the restoration of Arakan’s sovereignty to the people of Arakan.”
The guided policy has effectively mobilized the ethnic Rakhine people towards greater political autonomy for the Rakhine State. However, there continues to be uncertainty regarding the equal rights of other marginalized minorities, especially the Rohingya, who have a strained relationship with the ethnic Rakhine. This is due to the policy’s unclear positions on inclusiveness. In a report from USIP in 2020, concerns were raised about the attitude of AA toward the Rohingya, stating that “fears that the AA may eventually exhibit more overt anti-Muslim sentiments and potentially target Muslims in Rakhine cannot be discounted.”
Indeed, as the AA gains a foothold in Northern Rakhine state (now home to thousands of Rohingya, though more than 70,000 have fled since the genocide), the group continues to channel ideological superiority with its increasingly nationalist armed movement. In an interview with the BBC, AA’s leader Twan Mrat Naing said, “We will not accept any history that conflicts with our own narratives on the implications of Rohingya citizenship.” Under junta rule, the claims of a community’s historical presence in the region are directly linked to their identity and rights such as the exclusionary 1982 Citizenship Law. This legislation is built upon racialized and exclusionary politics of belonging. As a result, in Myanmar, the sense of belonging has been shaped by racial lines, notions of ‘nativity’, pre-colonial national identities, colonial population categories, and perceptions of ‘foreignness’. The junta stripped Rohingya of their citizenship by designating them as ‘Bengalis’, recent illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.
The AA implies a narrative similar to that of the junta, perceiving the name Rohingya to be born out of a dishonest political movement. In a social media post, AA’s leader stated: “Nothing is wrong with calling Bengalis ‘Bengalis’. They have been our neighbours, our friends and fellow citizens for centuries. Let’s be honest and embrace this reality to build a better future.” Moreover, in an interview with the New Humanitarian, AA stated, “by portraying themselves by another name, many dishonest Muslim community members, especially in the diaspora and elite circles, believe that they can claim as an indigenous ethnic group by erasing the evidence of colonial migration. From the perspective of the local native indigenous population, ‘Rohingya’ is a political movement to separate a part of Arakan, our fatherland, by destroying the integrity of our ancestral history.” AA echoed the rhetoric employed by the junta to depict the Rohingya as outsiders, labeling them as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. This narrative conveniently overlooks their historical presence in the country, while positioning the ethnic Rakhine as the rightful owners of the region.
The AA’s leader could call for the creation of a new history together which provides for a more inclusive future, but he chooses to impose ethnic Rakhine’s supremacy on everyone. The use of the term ‘Bengali’ by the AA marked an important shift in its stance on Rohingya. The AA had for several years avoided using the term “Bengali” (instead using “Muslim community”)– which the Rohingya consider a slur, because it implies that they are recent immigrants from Bangladesh and is used to deny their claims to citizenship. In other words, AA’s story of Rakhine State has revealed its ethnonationalist traits by reinstating the noxious values instilled by the junta and the exclusionary fate of the minorities within the regions as it secures widespread support from anti-junta forces.
Further, not only has AA backtracked on many of its pledges and commitments, but it is also on a mission to antagonize the anti-junta forces against the Rohingya community. When the military orchestrated protests of hundreds of Rohingya against AA using coercion and violence, AA spokesperson Khaing Thukha described the event as “one of the worst betrayals of anti-junta movement in history”. The AA leader also framed the Rohingya as affiliates of the sit-tat and accused them of dragging the resistance movement in the wrong direction, thus inciting Islamophobia. Twan Mrat Naing’s posted on the social media platform X stated “Some unscrupulous, brazen activists with potential links to militant organizations, who are losing ground in the field day by day, are clamorously spreading manipulated facts blended with plausible untruths in the media. The militant terrorists of SAC and their affiliates are still largely resisting from within the buildings in town. We will continue our mission to liberate the town and eliminate all evil forces.”
On another post on the same platform, he wrote: “The people of Myanmar are fighting against a brutal military regime with great tribulations and sacrifices. Please stop the selfish grumpiness and sabotage, [it is] dragging the struggle in the wrong direction. It is time to abandon your misbegotten scheme of creating a separate Islamic safe zone through foreign interventions, it is very unpatriotic.” In response, the anti-junta forces rally behind the AA not only as the hero of the Rakhine nationalist movement but also as a champion of the resistance movement.
On May 18, AA captured Buthidaung township and looted and set fire to the houses of the Rohingya, in addition to the extrajudicial killings. Thousands of Rohingya, including women, children and the elderly, were forced to flee for their lives. When Rohingya organizations called for international pressure on the group, Twan Mrat urged people “to not buy any distorted & misleading crap” that will slow down the anti-junta movement. In this case, the Rohingya were perceived as liars, making accusations based on false information to tarnish the image of the resistance movement.
Shortly after the AA’s various cruelties in Buthidaung, the spokesperson for the Secretary-General Stéphane Dujarric expressed the UN’s alarm over violence against the Rohingya. Following that, 195 revolutionary groups and civil society organizations in exile urged AA to carry out internal investigations of the alleged incidents and to act against the perpetrators if there were violations. The NUG also released a statement about the atrocities committed by the AA against the Rohingya and called for the cessation of all attacks on civilians and civilian property.
The AA in turn countered that the “allegations were false and biased towards Rohingya” and accused the signatories of “being useful idiots under the guise of human rights”, while urging the groups to “make their stances clear.” In response to the NUG’s statement, Twan Mrat Naing acknowledged the NUG as the foremost revolutionary group in Myanmar but said it should not speak more than is necessary when it comes to domestic affairs in Rakhine state. In another rebuff, he labelled the activists as “hypocritical friends singing to the tune of international donors and wished them a political future they deserve.”
Some resistance groups, particularly students, have since withdrawn from the joint statements by 195 revolutionary forces and civil society organizations on the situation in Northern Rakhine and blamed themselves for not properly understanding the situation. One example is the General Strike Committee (GSC) which comprises student leaders and political parties. The GSC was the very first of various organizations to include Rohingya representatives and openly advocate for their rights. In their withdrawal from the joint statement, the GSC said “the statement does not represent the standpoints of all the stakeholders involved in GSC” and it “guarantees support to maintain momentum for the offensive against the sit-tat” while apologizing to the people. Another group, Student Unions-Yangon, also withdrew from the joint statement citing similar concerns about complications among resistance groups in the region.
On August 5, it was reported that nearly 200 people lost their lives due to drone strikes and shelling by the AA, targeting civilians fleeing the conflict in Maungdaw town, which is located near the Bangladesh border. In response to this tragic incident, Fortify Rights called on the International Criminal Court (ICC) to initiate an investigation. As usual, Twan Mrat Naing responded with a tweet stating “Falsified, Rights Industrial Complex”. Any report on the atrocities of Rohingya is mocked by the AA at large and parrots the AA’s version of narratives. Nay San Lwin, a prominent Rohingya political activist, decried on a Facebook post, stating, “No matter who kills us, it’s fun for you. When we cry, you cheer.”
Speaking out against the atrocities and human rights abuses committed by the AA, in turn, fueled animosity against the Rohingya among the anti-junta forces. Subsequently, this led to an increase in social discrimination and the use of derogatory terms towards the Rohingya, such as ‘Bengali,’ kalar, or wat masar (individuals who abstain from pork). A journalist based in Rakhine, Kuang Mrat Naing, shared on Facebook (the post was subsequently deleted) that “the Rohingya are still not officially recognized in Myanmar. What is actually present are illegal Bengali immigrants. In Rakhine, of course, they are the kalars, who are now considered local terrorists.” According to the Blue Shirt Initiative (BSI) report, there are increasing posts on Facebook pages and Telegram channels escalating prejudice, hatred, stigmatization, and discrimination against the Rohingya people—especially after reports of Rohingya houses being burnt and the killing of one hundred Rohingya civilians following the AA’s seizure of Buthidaung.
Of course, the Rohingya would be at a disadvantage in openly supporting the armed revolution because of their open prison-like conditions and their trapped position between the powerful AA and junta troops. However, the anti-junta forces’ ignorance of the plight of the Rohingya and their clear alignment with nationalist armed groups to win their support in the fight against sit-tat are indicative of a wider denial of the identity and rights of the Rohingya people. A significant group is Yangon-based student union members who have spoken out for the rights of the Rohingya at a time when the majority is supporting the genocide, but are now aligned with the AA after receiving support for their armed resistance.
The Rohingya find themselves in a similar situation reminiscent of what happened during the so-called democratic transition period, where prioritizing reconciliation with the Tatmadaw overshadowed the catastrophic genocide. The historic turning point for the equality of Rohingya in the wake of the Spring Revolution is becoming increasingly distant.
As things currently stand, the people and resistance forces neglect the principles of federal democracy in the absence of a stable, comprehensive political system. The essential characteristics of federal democracy in the federal democracy charter are to oversee the affairs of a locality based on local knowledge, to increase local participation, and to create a close relationship between the local people and the government institutions.
Yet, the quest to implement changes in citizenship law necessary to build an inclusive democratic society in line with human rights remains a tall order. The National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) recently decided to repeal the 1982 Exclusionary Citizenship Law. However, it was hardly a unanimous decision as the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) and NUG withdrew from the conference ahead of the last day of the scheduled date before they could vote for the resolution.
Amid new concerns about the Rohingya crisis, exacerbated by the atrocities committed by the AA, NUG proclaimed that “the National Unity Government is fully committed to ensuring that the horrendous atrocities committed against minority communities in Myanmar, including the Rohingya, Rakhine, and others in Rakhine State, are never repeated. All attempts to foment divisions between ethnic communities must end. We will intensify our efforts to build trust, mutual respect, understanding and tolerance.”
But the NUG’s practical position toward the Rohingya remains uncertain and skeptical due to its dwarfed political influence over powerful ethnic armed groups. The absence of an established policy to address the needs and grievances of the minorities within minorities puts the future of Rohingya in even more uncertainty.
The problem of minorities within minorities is not confined to the Rohingya population and Rakhine State. There are large numbers of non-dominant ethnic groups in every ethnic state. Even after the fall of the junta, the challenge of constructing a political system that safeguards non-dominant ethnic groups from the oppression of the local majority to guarantee everyone equal rights will remain a challenge. However, the importance of forming allies among resistance forces should not overlook human rights violations committed by its allies against ethnic minorities. The democratic movement is not about anything alternative to the sit-tat but about a federal democratic society that guarantees the rights and equality for all communities.
Myo Min is a Research Assistant at the Yangon School of Political Science where he has contributed to research projects on political participation in Myanmar. His research focuses on questions of citizenship and social cohesion in Myanmar.
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