Michael Lin-Chiang Lee argues that Taiwan’s democratic values and diplomacy with Myanmar are met with challenges.
Myanmar (Burma) – The Republic of Union of Myanmar
Taiwan – The Republic of China (ROC)
Mainland China – The People’s Republic of China (PRC)
On May 20, 2024, Lai Ching-Te was inaugurated as the new president of Taiwan. While many countries sent their congratulatory messages, the current military junta of Myanmar (Burma) has denounced any relations with the government of Taiwan and remarked that Taiwan is an entity of the Chinese government, which sparked outrage in social media circles and others. The relationship between the ROC (not to be confused with the PRC) and Myanmar – is a complex topic with broader geopolitical dynamics involving mainland China towards the end of World War II and during the Cold War.
This report explores the intricate relationships among the three countries, emphasizing the public’s support for democracy in Myanmar and how both the populace and the governments influence the international dynamics. A significant part of the report focuses on the diplomatic complexities associated with the One China Principle, which asserts that there is only one sovereign state under the name China, encompassing both mainland China and Taiwan (ROC). The principle opposes the notion of two states named “China”—the PRC and ROC—and rejects the idea that China and Taiwan are two distinct countries. This stance often leads to geopolitical tensions, particularly involving nations that must navigate or choose their diplomatic relations with either side while addressing their national interests. The report examines how these interconnected factors shape the regional political landscape, highlighting the delicate balance between upholding democratic values and managing diplomatic ties with a major global power like China.
The origins of the One China Principle date to 1949 at the end of the Chinese Civil War. Following their defeat, the Nationalists, also referred to as the Kuomintang (KMT) withdrew to Taiwan and established Taipei as their government base, while at the same time, the Chinese Communist Party began administering from the mainland, forming the People’s Republic of China.
While there have been diplomatic relations between Myanmar and the Republic of China governments, it was short-lived. Relations started in 1947, a year before Myanmar’s independence. However, the Myanmar government switched to ally with the newly-formed PRC in 1950 due to border security and geopolitical reasons. Despite Taiwan not being a diplomatic ally or recognized as an independent state since the late 1940s, Taiwan’s political, economic, and cultural involvement in Myanmar has been significant. Alice Dawkins argues that the initial civil unrest along the Shan-China borders caused by remaining Kuomintang (KMT) soldiers and the newly-formed post-independent Myanmar military in 1948 led to the growing influence of the Tatmadaw, further destabilizing the region along the country’s borders. As tensions grew between the ethnic minorities in Shan and Karen states, the presence of foreign forces—such as the KMT and their allies—within the domestic territories contributed to growing political instability in the Myanmar parliament. In 1962, General Ne Win staged a coup after Prime Minister U Nu entrusted Ne Win to temporarily form a “caretaker government”.
Myanmar’s decision to sever diplomatic relations with the ROC cannot be viewed in isolation from the broader geopolitical shifts of the era. The military coup led by General Ne Win in 1962 marked a significant turning point in Myanmar’s political landscape, as he implemented the “Burmese Way to Socialism,” which sought to establish a socialist state with strong ties to the PRC and Soviet Union. This ideological shift was not merely a domestic affair but part of a larger strategy to align Myanmar more closely with the eastern bloc despite not being a part of it, while distancing itself from Western influences, including those from the ROC and the United States.
Under Chiang Kai-Shek, the ROC viewed the spread of communism in Southeast Asia as a direct threat to its survival, especially as it sought to maintain its claim as the legitimate government of China. The alignment of Myanmar with the Soviet Union and the PRC heightened concerns in Taiwan and its allies, leading to increased efforts to counter communist influence in the region. This was particularly evident in the broader context of the Cold War, where the ROC, with support from the United States, played a pivotal role in containing communism, as seen during the Vietnam War.
Since the 1960s, overseas Chinese nationals (including those resident in Myanmar) have migrated in large numbers to Taiwan due to worsening conditions against the Chinese community by the military junta. This includes the anti-Chinese riots in the 1960s and the exclusion of the ethnic Chinese from Myanmar. Many migrants have permanently settled in Taiwan since, as evident in the large Sino-Burmese community on the outskirts of Taipei City. The area is now a bustling neighborhood with shops and restaurants offering a mix of Burmese-Yunnan-Fujian cuisines.
It was not until 1996 with the implementation of the ROC government’s Go-South Policy that several Taiwanese companies began setting up factories in Myanmar to benefit from Myanmar’s low labour costs and strategic location between India and China—both huge markets to consider. These initial investments were mainly in textiles, later expanding to various sectors such as electronics and food processing. These industries have since supported Myanmar’s economic development and created employment opportunities for the country, despite the many challenges of political instability, foreign investment restrictions, and PRC’s position as the primary diplomatic ally for Myanmar’s civilian and military governments. Taiwan remains one of the major investment countries alongside Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore, setting up many industries and non-governmental organizations to assist the people of Myanmar before the coup of 2021.
After the 2021 coup, Taiwan-Myanmar relations grew significantly with the emergence of new movements advocating for democracy in Myanmar. Pro-democracy protesters in Myanmar sought out support from activists in Taiwan to garner public support through regional movements such as the Milk Tea Alliance. The Alliance consisted of netizens from Myanmar, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Thailand and was established to promote democratic values through social media and common culinary cultures. This has created a rift in PRC-Myanmar relations as the informal coalition has gained currency among pro-democracy activists in other regions and ASEAN countries. Taiwan, in particular, became a popular option for Myanmar people to migrate for work, studies, or temporary shelter. This migration pattern was evident especially since the start of the 2021 coup, and more recently, in the reinstated Military Service Law and forced conscription on February 10, 2024. Despite Taiwan’s aspirations and their show of unity for Myanmar’s democracy, the current military government and the exiled National Unity Government (NUG) adhere to the One China principle.
Myanmar’s economic and political considerations pandering to China could mean that the One China Principle is a more realistic approach for both the ruling junta and Myanmar’s government-in-exile, despite the PRC’s autocracy. The PRC is a major investor and strategic partner for Myanmar, providing critical infrastructural investments through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Chinese investment, mostly in the energy sector, accounts for 23.5 percent of total foreign investment in Myanmar, totalling 21.86 billion USD. Given the increasing US presence in the Indo-Pacific Region, China utilizes Myanmar’s geostrategic position as a corridor to partially reduce American influence in Southeast Asia. For example, China’s SEZ investments in the Kyaukpyu port in Rakhine State connects energy lines to reduce China’s reliance on Malaysia’s Malacca Strait and expand trade in Southeast Asia.
On the other hand, Taiwan’s stance towards BRI are mostly pessimistic and have not changed since the initial announcement by Beijing. The ROC has been skeptical of the PRC using the loans as debt traps to acquire certain points of interest in their expansion of influence through global trade. However, Myanmar’s heavy reliance on PRC investments and imports for its economic development is another major consideration for the junta and NUG’s allies as developments could economically benefit the people of Myanmar in various ways.
As such, if any ruling government of Myanmar formally recognizes Taiwan in opposition to the One China Principle, it could be a flashpoint for conflict—undermining important economic ties and creating negative diplomatic consequences for both Myanmar and China. Politically, China has been a broker for ceasefire negotiations in the region between The Three Brotherhood Alliance and the current military regime, after the rebels took control of key towns along the China-Myanmar border near Yunnan Province of China as well as parts of Rakhine State in early 2024.
China’s involvement as a broker in these peace talks highlights its significant influence over Myanmar’s internal conflicts. For the National Unity Government (NUG) in exile, which opposes the military regime, China’s role in facilitating these ceasefires could be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the NUG may view China’s mediation efforts as essential for stabilizing the region, making them cautious about openly engaging with Taiwan to avoid alienating China. On the other hand, if the NUG perceives China’s actions as favoring the military regime, they might reconsider their stance and explore closer ties with Taiwan as an alternative ally. Thus, the NUG’s approach to Taiwan could be influenced by their assessment of China’s role in the conflict—whether they see China as a peacemaker or as a supporter of their adversaries.
Any diplomatic tension could threaten ongoing and future projects in the China-Myanmar economic corridor, as well as endanger livelihoods of minority communities on the borders who may have closer connections to China rather than Taiwan. As an example, the autonomous Wa state between China and Myanmar run by the United Wa State Army (UWSA) would rather continue the current status quo of diplomatic relations with the PRC, on account of their lack of diplomatic relations with ROC. Along with the diplomatic isolation from economic sanctions leading to the loss of Chinese investment and trade, the UWSA’s change in recognition of the ROC could also heighten border tensions and regional instability. This could potentially trigger more internal unrest along the political landscape, and create economic difficulties for the general population despite Taiwan’s backing of Myanmar as a democratic ally and its support of Myanmar through smaller-scale financial investments, educational and medical supports as it does with the remaining diplomatic allies.
Given these complexities, Myanmar’s ethnic minority political allies, whether aligned with the military junta or not, are unlikely to alter their long-standing diplomatic stance. The potential risks of changing course and recognizing Taiwan are too significant, especially considering the historical ties and economic dependence on China.
If Myanmar were to establish formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, it would need strong support from Western countries like the U.S., the E.U., and the U.K. This could help Myanmar align with American interests in the Indo-Pacific, especially in countering China’s influence in the region. By working with Taiwan, which opposes China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Myanmar could strengthen its role in promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
However, this decision would require Myanmar to carefully manage its relationship with China. While closer ties with Taiwan and the West could be beneficial, they could also risk damaging Myanmar’s crucial relationship with its largest neighbor and key economic partner. Myanmar needs to strike a careful balance in its diplomacy to maintain good relations with both Taiwan and China, which is essential for the country’s stability and development in the long run.
As of July 2024, there are only 12 out of 194 countries in the United Nations that officially recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state, and neither the SAC nor NUG are among them. However, Taiwan maintains unofficial diplomatic channels and actively engages in civil societies and public diplomacy to promote its progressive national interests in democracy. For example, the New Southbound Policy of Taiwan updated in 2016 aims to enhance economic, cultural, and people-to-people ties with Southeast Asian nations, South Asia, Australia, and New Zealand. The policy focuses on fostering cooperation in trade, investment, education, and technology, aiming to reduce Taiwan’s economic dependence on China. It also encourages Myanmar students to study in Taiwan and promotes Taiwan-based charity organizations to provide educational scholarships and technical assistance to Myanmar students. To further deepen ties and collaborations, Taiwan’s government currently has its own representative office under the name of ‘Taipei Economic and Cultural Office’ in the city of Yangon.
Taiwan’s soft power in Myanmar is a blend of economic, cultural, and political efforts aimed at building a positive image, promoting its democratic values, and fostering deeper bilateral relations. These efforts are part of a broader strategy to enhance Taiwan’s influence and presence in Southeast Asia as a part of its New Southbound Policy amidst the geopolitical dynamics of the region and maintaining its tense relations with the Chinese counterpart in Beijing. Henceforth, although many people in Myanmar may prefer Taiwan over China due to its democratic and progressive values, the reality of China’s status as a regional economic and political superpower and Myanmar’s proximity to the PRC means that the current deadlock between the three entities under the One China Principle is likely to persist as a Trifecta of Diplomatic Relations in the years to come.
Michael Lin-Chiang Lee, also known as Aung Nyein Chan is an education consultant for students and people to find academic and career opportunities in Taiwan and Japan. Having lived in Myanmar for more than 15 years, he is an expert in researching relations between Taiwan and Myanmar (Burma). He has a Bachelor of Architecture and Master of Architecture and Urban Design from Chaoyang University of Technology, Taiwan, and Shibaura Institute of Technology, Japan, respectively. (LinkedIn)
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