I am not suggesting that Myanmar should despair at the thought of decreased trade and investment from the West (which often comes with its own downsides in any case). Rather, the concern is that the government risks losing the ability it developed under the Thein Sein administration to balance its global strategic relations and thus chart its own political and economic course.

As is seen in most developing countries, global powers might increasingly engage Myanmar only when they need resources or security cooperation, investing little in solving its most endemic political challenges or overcoming corruption. Legal protection from China, as before, could come at the price of increased preferential access to Myanmar’s abundant natural resources, which are already being exploited at concerning speed, with minimal transparency and few benefits to ordinary people.

Myanmar could also miss out on billions of dollars of aid and technical support earmarked for the civilian government’s core agendas, such as rebuilding social service systems, reforming public administration and financial systems, strengthening democracy and implementing its transition to federalism. Disbursements could be limited routine grants and loans on issues of global concern or associated with regional strategies, with less consideration of Myanmar’s specific needs. At the same time, civil society, political parties, and social welfare organisations, particularly those pursuing rights-based agendas, could find it increasingly difficult to access funds.

While the generals will likely avoid actual criminal penalisation, increased tension in that domain risks re-entrenching their siege mentality and leading to increased curtailment of civil rights, internal political opposition and media freedoms. In an extreme scenario, this raises the spectre of Myanmar retreating from cooperation on basic global security norms, creating a ‘security dilemma’ cycle that exponentially increases hostility between the country and the West. Though most foreign diplomats recognise this risk, the costs of discouraging international criminal action, which include public criticism at home and the weakening of international norms, are increasingly seen to outweigh the supposed benefit (continued involvement in an unconvincing “transition”).

To conclude, many people in Myanmar feel that international criticism is unfair and might understandably say they don’t need Western aid and diplomatic support if it comes at the expense of being patronised. Inevitably, however, successful “peace and development” will require careful management of these tensions to ensure that Myanmar is able to maximise the benefits of multiple global partnerships, avoid dependence on old allies, and remain in control of its own political future. This will require the government to demonstrate a commitment to basic humanitarian values and security norms both in the further handling of this crisis and in preventing future disasters.

Part II discusses two other sets of challenges resulting from the Rakhine crisis: 1) worsening relations with Muslim majority countries and 2) threats from transnational Islamist terrorists.